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To the Editor
In their commentary article, ‘The imperative to develop
a human vaccine for the Hendra virus in Australia’,
Zahoor and Mudie (1) argue the case for a human Hendra
virus (HeV) vaccine. The statements supporting their
arguments are incorrect and have the potential to cause
infection ecology &
epidemiology
T h e  O n e  H e a l t h  J o u r n a l

Infection Ecology and Epidemiology 2016.# 2016 Alison J. Peel et al. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), permitting all non-commercial use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
1
Citation: Infection Ecology and Epidemiology 2016, 6: 31658 - http://dx.doi.org/10.3402/iee.v6.31658
(page number not for citation purpose)
confusion and ultimately undermine confidence in current
evidence-based risk management strategies, thereby pla-
cing equine and human lives at risk.
The central argument in Zahoor and Mudie (1) is that
HeV is ‘rapidly mutating’, with consequent loss of efficacy
of the equine HeV vaccine, changing clinical syndromes in
humans, and infection in new animal species. There is no
scientific basis to their central argument. Zahoor and
Mudie (1) offer no citations to support their statements
regarding the mutation rate of HeV. Indeed, primary
research indicates the HeV genome has minimal variability
(less than 1% at both the nucleotide and amino acid levels)
in both flying-foxes and horses and is highly stable
(the same variant has been detected at disparate locations
at the same time, and over periods of at least 12 years) (2, 3).
There is no evidence that the equine HeV vaccine is
becoming less effective. Continuing equine HeV cases
do not reflect loss of vaccine efficacy as stated by Zahoor
and Mudie (1), but rather a failure of some horse owners to
vaccinate their horses. There have been no HeV cases in
vaccinated horses. The efficacy and safety of the recombi-
nant equine vaccine has been clearly demonstrated (46),
and both government and industry animal health autho-
rities strongly recommend its use as ‘the single most
effective way of reducing the risk of Hendra virus infection
in horses’ (7).
There is no evidence that the nature of human HeV
infection is changing. The seven recognised human cases
have shared clinical features but are insufficient in
number to determine changes over time (813).
There is no evidence that recently reported canine cases
indicate that HeV is ‘seeking new co-hosts’. The wide host
range of HeV in experimental studies is well established
(14, 15). The two observed cases of natural HeV infection
in dogs most likely resulted from exposure to infected
horses, or contaminated material from these horses, and
their detection may reflect increased surveillance of
canines on infected equine premises (16).
There is no evidence that HeV infections ‘are emerging
in locations far beyond bats’ typical migratory bound-
aries’. Several recent publications demonstrate that the
spatial occurrence of equine HeV cases reflects the dis-
tribution of black and spectacled flying-foxes (1719).
In conclusion, we express no objection to the devel-
opment of a human vaccine against HeV; however, we are
emphatic that Zahoor and Mudie (1) are unjustified in
using viral evolution, vaccine inefficiency, and changing
clinical syndromes as motivations. There are no data to
support their case.
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